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How do we know if prevention is working? Not only is the measurement of prevention
activities possible, the methodologies of “how” to measure already exist in numerous
processes. Additionally, the definitions of “what” to measure have been both experienced
and discussed. This article argues that measuring prevention can be accomplished by
examining and evaluating the pieces that make up the whole and demonstrates that not
only is prevention measurable, that measurement is well within our reach. Measuring
effectiveness is not always done at the level of final outcomes. Often, the processes and
systems (or outputs) that lead to preferred outcomes are measured when ultimate outcome
measurement is impossible. To increase our understanding of how to combat terrorism,
we need to put the argument of immeasurable prevention behind us and accept that
prevention can be quantified, at least by evaluating the parts of the whole.
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INTRODUCTION 
How do we know if prevention is working? How do we know if all the efforts and 
resources directed towards stopping the next attack are worthwhile? How do we measure 
a negative? How do we continue to justify the diversion of public funds from other 
essential services if our only justification for success will be “nothing happened?” If we 
could count how many attacks were stopped or deterred, measuring prevention would 
obviously be a simple task and this article would be superfluous. Unfortunately, inherent 
in an ability to count what the enemy has decided not to do requires an ability to read the 
minds of our foes or, at the very least, an ability to constantly observe their internal 
decision cycles. Even if the absence of an attack were not the result of a conscious 
decision by the terrorist, but rather the result of some unfortunate (from their point of 
view) circumstance, our ability to quantify the elimination of the threat would require a 
much deeper intelligence capability than we are able to construct.  If we could peer so 
deeply into the opposition that we could count each of their failures, this same capability 
would also make the entire homeland security enterprise moot. 
 The ability to measure the prevention of terrorist attacks is vitally important for a 
number of reasons. First, there is the accountability issue. The nation, at all levels of 
government and the private sector, is investing vast amounts of funds and efforts to 
“prevent the next attack.” Not only that, we have reorganized significant portions of the 
federal government (and some states as well) to protect our citizens, economy, 
infrastructure and way of life from another horrendous attack upon the homeland. How 
do we know we are succeeding? What type of examination tells us we have been wise in 
our investments, or have we been lucky in spite of them? Secondly, we need to 
effectively guide, and justify, future investments. Without a rational argument and 
measurement process to explain the benefits of expenditures on prevention activities, we 
are not only apt to suffer deserved criticism; we also risk sacrificing future investments, 
political credibility and the public’s faith. Third, and most importantly, how can we claim 
to be effectively protecting the safety and security of the nation without any way of 
determining whether our path and efforts are, at the least, mostly correct and rational? 
 This is critical.  In the absence of more attacks (and this is a good thing), we are in 
effect asking the public and appropriators to “trust us” on our near and long term efforts 
to prevent terrorist attacks. How long will this trust last? Is it already waning? How long 
can we justify expenditures on this particular public good versus all the others? On the 
other hand, should another attack occur we will once again dissect every effort we made 
to prevent it.  How will our response to the investigation be viewed if our efforts are 
based upon unmeasured, unguided and illogically resourced actions to prevent the 
tragedy in the first place? 
 Now the good news: not only is the measurement of prevention activities possible, the 
methodologies of “how” to measure already exist in numerous processes. Additionally, 
the definitions of “what” to measure have been both experienced and discussed. This 
article will argue that measuring prevention can be accomplished by examining and 
evaluating the pieces that make up the whole and demonstrate that not only is prevention 
measurable, that measurement is well within our reach. I will support this argument by 
discussing and justifying the concept behind process measurement; by briefly examining 
some current thoughts of what might comprise prevention; and then by proposing and 
testing one methodological possibility. 
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PROCESS MEASUREMENT 
We are not at the place where we can declare a victory of intelligence. Nor should we be 
so shortsighted that we are willing to continue a massive investment in preventive action 
without a means to measure whether it is at all effective. But, to argue against the 
counting negatives parable, measuring effectiveness is not always done at the level of 
final outcomes. Often, the processes and systems that lead to preferred outcomes are 
measured when ultimate outcome measurement is impossible. Emergency management 
agencies are not (usually) measured by how many houses are or are not flooded in a 
storm event; rather, the systems and programs that help prevent flooding are measured 
against accepted standards of practice1. Fire agencies are not generally measured by how 
many houses are saved or burn; their response times are measured to quantify and 
compare increased/decreased efficiency versus the inputs they invest. We may not know 
"how many shipwrecks does a lighthouse prevent?”2 but we can evaluate the design and 
decision processes that lead to the specific placement of lighthouses and come to some 
conclusion as to the soundness of these decisions without knowing whether ships did or 
did not crash because of them. 
 Why can't prevention efforts, especially at the state and local levels, be evaluated in a 
similar fashion? We can set in place sound and reasoned prevention practices and 
standards that we can confidently conclude will lead to the prevention of terrorist attacks. 
These practices and/or approaches can then be measured in pieces or comprehensively to 
give some sense of a program’s effectiveness. For example, if it is accepted that a critical 
piece of the prevention process is the establishment of a collaborative system that enables 
and promotes the integration and analysis of data from all sources (from both inside and 
outside the law enforcement community) – which in turn better guides protection 
measure decisions – then the existence or nonexistence of this system is a measurement. 
If it does not exist, one could reasonably postulate that prevention is weaker. If we took 
all the pieces of one simplified prevention process (threat identification, target evaluation, 
risk assessment, or response/protection decisions) and detailed the sub-components of the 
process, we could ideally come up with a systematic approach in which many of the 
individual pieces of the overall process could be measured. If all, or most, of the pieces 
are effective, then the whole might be effective. This of course assumes that whatever 
model process we propose actually portrays a sound and reasoned approach that, when 
employed, leads to better prevention. 
 The Department of Homeland Security’s Office for Domestic Preparedness proposes a 
prevention process model in their Prevention Guidelines for Homeland Security3 that 
could be used to describe both the process to be assessed as well as up to 165 individual 
tasks and/or outputs. The National Preparedness Guidance4 takes the guidelines’ model 
further and identifies a list of target capabilities that are desired for the entire spectrum of 
the homeland security effort from prevention to recovery, as well as some common cross-
cutting capabilities required in all mission areas.  
 Specifically, this guidance identifies the prevention and protection target capabilities, 
or “things we should be able to do well,5” as follows:  
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Prevention Mission Area: Information Collection and Threat Detection, Intelligence 
Fusion and Analysis, Information Sharing and Collaboration, Terrorism Investigation and 
Apprehension, and CBRNE Detection;  
Protection Mission Area: Risk Analysis, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 
Food/Agriculture Safety and Defense, Public Health Epidemiological Investigation and 
Testing, and Citizen Preparedness and Participation. 
 For discussion purposes, all the processes and elements mentioned above might be 
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There are arguably (and it will be argued) many ways to portray all the possible 
prevention components and tasks in a succinct and simple diagram. The point here is not 
so much how the final, best model process could best be visually depicted; it is how such 
a reasonably sound process could be measured by component, task, and/or output. 
 
DEFINING THE PIECES OF THE PROCESS:  OUTCOMES TO OUTPUTS 
What are outcomes? Harry P. Hatry defines them, as “events, occurrences or changes in 
conditions, behavior, or attitudes that indicate progress toward achievement of the 
mission and objectives of the program. Thus outcomes are linked to the program’s (and 
its agency’s) overall mission – its reason for existing, [emphasis added].”7 When 
considering the establishment of any organized structure for prevention, the immediate 
step after determining its mission or objective should be the establishment of measurable 
outcomes that will help focus efforts to advance that mission. The General Accounting 
Office in April of 2002 testified to the Senate Committee on Government Affairs that two 
key ingredients were missing from then current strategic efforts towards combating 
terrorism: the lack of measurable outcomes and the lack of the identification of 
appropriate roles for state and local governments.8 This testimony occurred prior to the 
publication of the National Strategy for Homeland Security in June 2002 and its impact 
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on the authors of the strategy is unknown. Can measurable and achievable prevention 
outcomes be developed? 
 From the example process above, it is possible to rephrase the four major elements 
into four measurable desired outcomes or goals for an organizational effort to prevent 
terrorist attacks: 1) the increased ability to identify indications of an existing or future 
threat; 2) the increased ability to evaluate the potential of threats as they are identified; 3) 
the reduced vulnerability of critical infrastructures and other potential targets; and 4) the 
increased appropriateness of protection and/or other threat response activities. 
 Together, these four outcomes describe elements of a risk assessment process that 
could ultimately provide policy makers and executive decision authorities an objective 
cost-benefit analysis that will help guide their final actions in response to identified 
terrorist threats. 
 Taking it one step further, outputs could also be proposed for measuring each of the 
desired outcomes. Clearly the list of outputs for the prevention of terrorism could draw 
from hundreds of potential courses of action. But some of the “highest order” outputs 
could provide a starting point for organized actions. At this level of detail, it is important 
to note that what might comprise prevention on an international, foreign policy scale is 
unlikely to be the same as that for state and local governments or the private sector. For 
the four prevention outcomes identified above, I propose thirteen individual outputs that 
might be applied in a domestic stetting: 
Outputs for Outcome One, the increased ability to identify indications of an existing 
or future threat: 1) development of a strategy and commensurate business plans that 
describe how to assure the collaboration and coordination amongst all entities that 
participate in the threat identification processes; 2) creation and implementation of a 
system to collect, screen and store relevant information with investigative value9; and 3) 
development of a training system that provides adequate basic level threat awareness 
education to all public service entities, the private sector, and the general public as 
appropriate.  
Outputs for Outcome Two, the increased ability to evaluate the potential of threats 
as they are identified: 1) adoption or development of an appropriate analytical model to 
assess threat indications; 2) ensured collaboration and integration of assessment and 
evaluation processes from traditional as well as non-traditional investigative entities, (e.g. 
health and agricultural agencies); 3) creation and/or assignment of a lead organization to 
oversee and coordinate a system of threat identification and assessment processes; and 4) 
through policy, legislative and/or executive action, the identification and development of 
strategies to overcome barriers to the appropriate sharing of information and intelligence 
products. 
Outputs for Outcome Three, reduced vulnerability of critical infrastructures and 
other potential targets: 1) assignment or creation of a lead entity to oversee the effort to 
identify, assess vulnerabilities of, analyze consequences, and recommend protective 
strategies and priorities of critical infrastructures and potential targets of terrorists; 2) 
development and oversight of strategies and action plans that maximize the collaboration 
and coordination of the owners of potential targets and the entity’s effort to reduce their 
vulnerabilities; and 3) provision of a leadership point to assure the coordination between 
private, local, state, and federal critical infrastructure protection efforts. 
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Outputs for Outcome Four, increased appropriateness of protection and/or other 
threat response activities: 1) establishment and oversight of a process that ensures the 
interconnection of the first three outcomes and results in recommendations for protection 
decisions and threat response measures; 2) development of a risk management or cost 
benefit tool that will guide appropriate protection and response action decisions; and 3) 
development of a methodology that delineates responsibilities for varying degrees of 
decision-making amongst and between levels of government and the private sector. 
 These outputs and objectives could be modified, added to, or otherwise changed to 
better reflect the needs and expectations of individual government or private sector 
entities. The important and critical assumption is that should all of these elements be 
implemented effectively, it will help lead to the prevention of terrorist attacks, and 
therefore the evaluation of these outputs will provide a viable measurement tool. The 
emphasis again is measuring a logical and reasonable process that would, by its 
implementation, lead to better prevention. This approach does not attempt to measure 
prevention through the accounting of non-attacks which, as stated earlier, is either 
impossible or at least not quantifiably consistent. One way to analyze the validity of the 
proposed outcomes and outputs is to ask the negative of each of the elements. In other 
words, if these four outcomes and thirteen outputs were not in place, could we reasonably 
assume that the likelihood of a successful terrorist attack is greater? Without these 
elements in place, the leaders of an organizational effort to prevent terrorism would have 
no systems or processes by which to identify the threats, to analyze and evaluate 
probabilities, to prioritize potential targets for protection or to make good risk 
management decisions about what actions to take in a threat environment. If this were the 
case, I would measure this particular entity’s overall ability to prevent a terrorist attack as 
extremely low. They would have to instead rely upon luck, or on the decision of the 
enemy not to attack them for some other rationale unknown to the defending 
organization. 
 
A MEASUREMENT EXAMPLE 
There are numerous applications and methodologies for converting desired outcomes and 
outputs to measurement language. Examples of measurement methodologies include 
everything from an exhaustive process involving the assignment of values or weights to 
each element and its detailed tasks, to a simpler exercise in which one might use stop 
light colors for each element; (e.g. “red” means no effort or system in place to achieve the 
output or outcome, “yellow” indicates some efforts are underway or partially completed, 
and “green” designates completion or sustained efforts in effect).  Finding the “how” to 
measure is the easy part. There are any number of models to use and hundreds of expert 
consultants, contractors and academics ready to engage in methods for measurement. 
Defining the “what” to measure is where we are challenged. 
 For a brief illustrative example that applies one method for “how” to measure the 
“what” I am proposing, I have used outcome number Two: Increased ability to evaluate 
the potential of threats as they are identified. Applying a simple numerical weighting 
system to the outputs, each has been graded according to the following scale and criteria. 
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0 = No effort or system underway nor recognition of the need 
 1 = Recognition of the need but no effort or resources to accomplish the output 
 2 = Initial efforts and resources underway to achieve the output 
 3 = Moderate progress towards accomplishing the output 
 4 = Sustained efforts underway and output near to fulfillment 
 5 = Output achieved and resources devoted to sustain the effort 
For this example, I have assigned a numerical assessment to each of the outputs and 
provided a fictional, but plausible, narrative of that evaluation.  
 
Measurement of Outcome Two  
(Increased ability to evaluate the potential of threats as they are identified) 
 
Measurement of 2-1 
Adoption or development of an appropriate analytical model to assess threat indications.  
Score = 2 
Through the intended, financed and planned, yet to be implemented, establishment of a 
state fusion center, it is expected that an analytical model will be utilized based upon 
national best practices or customized design.  
Measurement of 2-2
Ensured collaboration and integration of assessment and evaluation processes from 
traditional as well as non-traditional investigative entities, (e.g. health and agricultural 
agencies.) 
Score = 2.5 
While the formal fusion center and system is yet to be established, all law enforcement 
agencies and non-law enforcement entities have recognized the requirement to participate 
in the sharing and dissemination of information and intelligence. Staff have been 
identified and protocols have been established to transfer threat and vulnerability related 
data and to participate in evaluation of such data in a collaborative fashion. 
 
Measurement of 2-3
Creation and/or assignment of a lead organization to oversee and coordinate a system of 
threat identification and assessment processes. 
Score = 4 
The state patrol’s intelligence division has been assigned lead responsibility for the 
achievement of this objective. It has been resourced by both state and federal funds and 
its efforts are monitored and accountable to the Governor, the state patrol chief and the 
homeland security director. Long term strategic planning and budgeting efforts have been 
completed and approved, in concept, by the state legislature. 
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Measurement of 2-4
Through policy, legislative and/or executive action, identification and development of 
strategies to overcome barriers to the appropriate sharing of information and intelligence 
products. 
Score = 2.5 
While much discussion and some action has overcome and/or satisfied some privacy act 
and civil liberty issues, much work remains to be done; specifically, in the issue area of 
the sharing and protection of data shared between the public and private sectors. 
 Out of a possible “score” of 20 for objective Two, this fictional entity measures 11 
(the total of the four scored outputs). So one might say that this entity’s “increased ability 
to evaluate threats as they are identified” is not yet realized but is progressing. Therefore, 
in combination with the other three prevention objectives, the executives could 
reasonably assess their overall prevention efforts, at least at a strategic level. While as 
much subjectivity as possible can be taken out of this process through firmer scoring 
criteria, the question of whether this objective or its outputs are important to overall 
prevention will most likely be a subjective decision by the senior officials responsible. 
But this simple evaluation can at least paint a picture of the level of progress in this 
element from which further resource, executive guidance, or prioritization can be 
accomplished. The score may be acceptable at this point in time and the executive 
directive is to continue as planned. Or the assessment may be judged to be woefully 
inadequate and the timeframe for the establishment of a fusion center is accelerated. 
 As stated before, there are many variations and available tools to measure objectives 
and outputs. Additionally, what is deemed important to be measured could deviate or 
adjust from the proposed tool presented here and the outputs could be expanded and 
examined at a greater level of detail. The key question again is if, by measuring the 
pieces of a logical approach that can be reasonably expected to lead to better prevention, 
can overall prevention itself be measured and evaluated?  If (as this article suggests) the 
answer is yes, then not only can investments and efforts be more logically and justifiably 
applied, the public good is better served by measured and guided efforts that actually lead 
to the intended result. 
 
CONCLUSION 
As proposed in the introduction, this concept of measurement by process effectiveness is 
not ground-breaking.  The public health community proposed this approach for their 
evaluation of efforts to combat bio-terrorism and other catastrophic threats10. Their effort 
was comprised of two major objectives. One, to measure the ability of the public health 
community to respond to all events – not just bio-terrorism – by measuring its 
preparedness for other threats such as West Nile Virus, SARS and an influenza season; 
and two, to measure such preparedness by evaluating the pieces (e.g. an epidemiological 
surveillance capacity,) of the overall processes which, when working in concert, are 
designed to achieve an effective prevention and response capability. 
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There are also other potentials for measurement, not discussed in this article, 
involving the measurement of other consequences of those systems primarily designed 
for counter-terrorism. For example, if the systems and actions to better share law 
enforcement threat data to identify potential terrorists also serve to increase the ability to 
identify and capture non-terrorist criminals, then the increase/decrease of common 
criminals identified could indicate measurement of the overall system as well. While the 
examples presented above are over-simplified, they demonstrate the enormous potential 
and opportunities to measure prevention without having to rely on “what did not happen.” 
 This article is written in the middle of the year 2005, a time when the congress, state 
and local governments, and their executing agencies are all focusing on the homeland 
security funding questions of “how much?” and “how will we know when it is enough?” 
For some mission areas, measurement will be easy.  Consequently, the policy debates 
over what capability gaps to “buy,” will be less esoteric. The gap between not enough 
communications gear and almost enough will be much simpler to quantify than the one 
between the unknown amount of prevention we possess and the near to perfect results we 
demand, but cannot define. But if we do nothing else, we need to put the argument of un-
measurable prevention behind us and accept that it can be quantified, at least by proxy 
and/or by evaluating the parts of the whole. Oddly, considering the purpose of this article, 
the near-term challenge we face is not the establishment and acceptance of a system that 
depicts prevention in measurable outcomes and outputs.  The real challenge will be to 
avoid the temptation to only resource those missions we already understand versus those 
of vastly more importance that we are just learning to build. 
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